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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
BARBARA LYON, 
Plaintiff and Respondent. 
vs. 
HARTFORD ACCIDENT AND 
INDEMNITY COMPANY, 
Def endam,t atnd .A.ppeUo;n,t, 
and 
YOSEMIT'E INSURANCE, 
COMPANY, 
Def evn,d,am,t. 
Case No. == 1a..•' f 
BRIE'F OF PLAINTIFF, RESPONDENT AND 
CROSS-APPELLANT 
Appeal from a Judgment of the Third District Court 
In and for Salt Lake C'ounty, Utah 
The Honorable Gordon R. Hall, Judge 
WORSLEY, SNOW & CHRIS:TENSEN 
and HAROLD G. CHRISTENSEN 
7th Floor, Continental Bank Bldg. 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
Attorneys for Def endoot OJYtd .A.welloot. 
FILED 
JUL 1 51970 
HATCH McRAE 
RlCHARDSON & KINGHORN 
707 Boston Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
Attorneys for Plaimtif f 
.and Respondent. 
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SUMNER ...J. HATCH 
ROBERT M. McRAE 
HATCH, McRAE, RICHARDSON & KINGHORN 
ATTORNEYS AT LAW 
L. E. RICHARDSON 
GERALD H. KINGHORN 
L. M. Cummings 
Clerk of the Supreme Court 
State Capitol Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
707 BOSTON BUILDING 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84111 
TELEPHONE 364-6474 
November 10, 1970 
Re: Barbara Lyon v Hartford Accident and Indemnity Co., et al 
Case No. 12068 
Dear Mr. Cummings: 
Please add the following citations to the Respondent's brief on file 
for argument this date: 
POIN'T I 
Moore v. Hartford Fire Insurance Co., 155 SE2d 128 (1967) 
American Mutual Ins. Co. v. Romero, 10th Cir. Ct, 428 F.2d 870 (1970) 
POINT II 
In re Hutchison v. Hartford Insurance Co., NY s.ct.App. (not in 
advance sheets up to 314 NY2d, Vol. 3), summarized in CCH Automobile Law 
Reports #136, Aug. 28, 1970, page 3. 
cc Harold G. Christensen 
cc Burningham & Dee 
Respectfully submitted 
-;%1 L l. 
.ELZELfil! Ltiiili 
// 
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IN THE SUPRf:ME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
BARBARA LYON, 
Plaintiff and Respondent_. 
vs. 
HARTFORD AiCCIDENT AND 
INDEMNITY COMP ANY, 
Defendant and Appellant, 
and 
YOSEMIT.E} INSURANCE 
CO.MP ANY, 
Defendant. 
Case No. 
12068 
BRIJ~F OF PLAINTIFF, RESPONDENT AND 
CROSS-APPELLANT 
NATUR.E OF THE CASE 
This is an action to recover against respondent's in-
surance company for her damages incurred by an unin-
rnred motorist. It is also a case of first impression in 
this Court and in some respects in the United States. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
Respondent was granted a summary judgment 
against appellant and defendant Yosemite, who did not 
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appeal, by 'I1he Honorable Cordon R. Hall in the District 
Court of Salt Lake County, Utah. Appellant appeal!:; 
from the granting of a portion of the motion for sum-
mary judgment and respondent cross-appeals from tht' 
denial of certain portions of said motion for summary 
judgment. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondent seeks to sustain the judgment of tht> 
lower court insofar as the same was granted in her favor 
and seeks a reversal of the lower ('OUrt denying judt,rment 
on the points raised on cross-appeal. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Respondent, Barbara Lyon, was injured while a 
guest passenger in an automobile driven by one Bernie 
:Jiartin('Z on F\,hrnci.ry -:. 1 D; 9. .:\ eivil aetion was 
brought against Scott Gould :Kickel, an uninsured motor-
ist driver of one vehicle, and Robert G. Butcher, an in-
sured motorist driver of a second vehiclt•, claiming that 
each was jointly and S(:>Yerally liable to respondent for 
the serious injuries she had suffered as a result of said 
collision. Judgment was entered on a jury verdict 
against both defendants on Angust 7, 1969, in the sum 
of $70,0~~) 7G. See 1,Tol. I I t1f Lhe 1'ram:t•ript on Appeal 
<'Ontaining the file of CiYil Ko. 18-1-99-1: 1Yhich is the civil 
action in which the judgment was rendered. See also the 
oxhihit envelope pertaining to that file as documentation 
for the serious and }l('rmnrn"nt disfiguring injuries re-
fo;pondent suffered as a result of ~ickel 's and Butcher's 
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1wgligence. Prior to the trial date in the first civil action, 
Butcher, through his insurance company, made an offer 
of judgment for his policy lilllits (R. 222), which was 
not accepted, and expired in accordance with the Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure, as a result of the trial (R. 255). 
The sum of $3,000.00 plus the cost bill of $51.90 was paid 
to respondent, and the sum of $2,000.00, being the balance 
of Allstate's liability, was paid to the Clerk of Salt Lake 
County (R. 260), as a result of the filing of a complaint 
in intervention for said sum by appellant on August 1, 
1969, (R. 224), the $2,000.00 having been paid by appel-
lant under its Medical Payments Provision of respond-
mt's own family automobile insurance policy (R. 1). 
Hartford also had written a single limits Uninsured 
l\lotorist clause insuring l\Iiss Lyon against this type loss, 
the principle amount of which was $20,000.00. Yosemite 
Insurance Company became involved in the instant civil 
action because it was the insuring company for the ve-
hide in which respondent was a guest passenger at the 
time she received her injuries. Part of the coverage writ-
ten on the automobile in which ~Iiss Lyon was riding in-
cluded an rninsured ::\fotorists clause v.rith minimum 
policy limits of $10/20,000. 
After obtaining the above jury verdict, respondent 
brought a direct civil action against Hartford and Yose-
mite for recovery of the sum of her damages as assessed 
by the jury for which she had not been paid. After Judge 
Hall granted to respondent a smmnary judgment (R. 
125) from which this appeal arises, Yosemite paid the 
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amount of the judgment aSSl'ssed by the lower court 1 
against it and respondent accepted same as a partial com-
vromise settlement of her dai111 (R. 138). Hartford ap-
1 
pealed and Barbara Lyon ernss-appealed. 
Part of the record on appeal in this case includes 
pleadings, a deposition and arguments of law on certain 
requests for admissions of fact from the Plaintiff to the 
insurance company defendants as to whether or not a 
defense asserted by them that Nickel had a valid policy 
of public liability insurnnre in force at the time of the 
accident was a true fact. That issue \Vas resolved against 
the insurance companies has not been raised on appeal, 
and is, therefore, not now material to this case. 
POINTS ON APPEAL AND CROSS-APPEAL 
POINT I 
THE LEGISLATURE HAVING ENACTED AN UNIN-
SURED MOTORIST J,AW IN THIS STATE IN 1967, THE 
FORMER RULE OF LAW OF THIS COURT IN RUSSELL VS. 
POULSEN (1966), IS NOT APPLICABLE, AND RESPOND-
ENT IS ENTITLED TO ALL AVAILABLE UNINSURED 
MOTORIST COVERAGE UP TO THE AMOUNT OF HER 
ACTUAL GENERAL AND SPECIAL DAMAGES WHICH, IN 
THIS CASE, INCLUDES THE $20,000.00 SINGLE LIMITS 
POLICY WRITTEN BY APPELLANT. 
~41-12-21.1 Utah Code Annotated was enacted by 
the 1967 Legislature. It requirrs sale of uninsured motor-
ist coverage with automobile insurance unless expressly 
rejected by the insured in writing. The policy in question 
contains the following terminolobry : 
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"Protection against uninsured motorists: ThP-
compauy ·will pay all smns which the insured or 
his legal representative shall be legally entitled 
to recover as damages from the owner or operator 
of an uninsured highway vehicle because of bodily 
injlll')' rnstained by the insured caused by acci-
deu t arn1 arising out of the ownership mainten-
ance or use of such uninsured highway vehicle ... " 
(R. 42) 
Hartford still includes as further terminology in its 
policy a duty to arbitrate and to obtain its consent to sue 
for a determination of liability and damages, which 
elauses have heretofore been held invalid almost univer-
sally. 
When .Hartford purports to agree to pay "all sums 
which the insured ... shall be legally entitled to recover 
... ," respondent submits that this is exactly what she 
is asking for and has demanded that Hartford pay under 
the Uninsured Motorists clause of its policy, specifically, 
$20,000.00. Referring the Court to Russell v. Poulsen, 
18 Utah 2d 157, 417 P. 2d 658 (1966), upon which appel-
lant relies, we submit that the intent of the Legislature 
in enacting the above statute now changes and overrides 
llrnt decision. vYe further submit that what may then 
have been the majority case rule as followed by this 
Court in 1966 is now the minority rule in interpreting 
in uninsured motorist cases the "other insurance" pro-
visions relied upon by appellant. They are now being 
invalidated whether th0 form be "prorata," "ex:cess in-
surance," or "excess-escape." \Ve further believe that 
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the statement in 28 A.L.R. 3<l at 539 is the current trend 
of the law: 
''The following cases hold or recognize that 
an 'other insurance' provision, whether in the 
form of a 'pro rata,' 'excess insurance,' 'excess-
escape,' or other similar clause, as it has variously 
appeared in the cases cited, is invalid, when con-
tained in a policy providing protection against in-
juries caused by uninsured motorists, to deny, 
within its general lii:iits, recovery of proper dam-
ages, on the ground that this type of provision 
limits the protection afforded the insured in a 
manner contrary to the policy behind statutes re-
quiring insurers to provide uninsured motorist 
coverage, and not limiting the tota.Z recovery 
allowable by one sit ff ering damages from am unin 
insured motorist." (See cases cited, emphasis 
added.) 
Discussing Sellers 1'. United States Fidelity & Guar-
ranty Company, ( 1966 Fla.), 185 So. 2d 869, the annota-
tor above makes the following observation: 
"There appeared to be no latitude in the sta-
tute, the court said, for an insurer to limit its lia-
bility through such 'other insurance' clauses, and 
if the statute was to be meaningful and controlling 
in respect to the nature and extent of the cover-
age, the sources of recovery, and the subrogation 
of the insurer, all incom;i8tent clause::; in the pol-
icy must be judiciall>' rejected, although insured 
would not be permitted to 'pyramid' recoveries." 
(double recovery) 28 A.L.R. 3d p. 560. 
Arizona, in Geyer v. Resen_;e Insurance Company 
(1968), 447 P. 2d 556, 561 was called upon to inh•rpret 
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its almost identieally vnhatim l'ninsured Motorist stat-
uk enacted in 19G3. ln this ease the Arizona court elim-
inated an)' belief that lJl"Pviom; decisions might support 
•Jie validity of "oiht'l' insurn11ce'' clauses and joined the 
current trend of eases relied upon by respondent which 
accumulate all available~ policies to aid in full and com-
plde compensation of an injured person. Referring to 
other Arizona decisions, the court stated in deciding for 
tlie insured in a fact situation similar to Russell v. Poul-
·' '11, whose claim exceeded another company's limits: 
"They (previous cases) indicate to us that 
Arizona will nowhere but in the forefront of 
jurisdictions in making available to automobile 
accident victims the fullest extent of insurance 
coverage . . . nothing in the nature of a con-
strained construction is required to hold that the 
minimum limits of our uninsured motorist legis-
lation are a part of every policy issued containing 
such coverage, and the prescribed limits cannot be 
reduced by off setting policy provisions. 
* * * 
mrhe apparent intent of the Legislature was 
to provide for uninsured motorists coverage in 
the stated minimum amount, unless the coverage 
was rejected. 
* * * 
"We add, for emphasis, that all that has been 
said herein is applicable only to the extent of the 
total legal damages of the claimant. Nothing we 
have stated in this opinion is to be construed as 
permitting or tending to permit 'double recovery' 
or windfall to the insured under separate cover-
ages in exeess of her actual legal damages." 
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IN vVIDDIS, 62 NORTHWESTERN UNIVER-
SITY LAW REVIEW (Nmnber 4), page 497, at page 
520, the author states: 
"The policy creates an exclusion according to 
which 'the insurance does not apply ... so as tu 
inure directly or indiredly to the benefit of any 
workman's compensation or disability carrier .. .' 
In addition, the policy provides that any amount 
payable under the terms of this insurance 'shall 
be reduced by ... the amount paid and the present 
value of all amounts payable ... under any work-
man's compensation law, disability benefits law or 
any singular law,' and that the 'company shall not 
be obligated to pay under this insurance that part 
of the damages which the insured may be entitle<l 
to recover ... which represents expenses for medi-
cal services paid or payable under the medical 
payments coverage of the policy.' Adherence to 
such provisions is certainly justifiable where the 
available benefits exceed the damages sustained 
by the insured. But where the actual damages 
sustained are in excess of the dan1ages indemni-
fied by either a workman's compensation plan or 
the medical coverage of the insured's policy, the 
uninsured motorist endorsement would still limit 
the policy's protection making it unavailable to 
supplement payments from these other sources. 
Allowing the insured to recover up to the limits 
of his policy, so long as he is not bevng comper1--
sated twice, would be consistent with the principlP, 
of indemnity, that the individual should not be 
allowed to acheive a net gain through the receipt 
of insurance proceeds from several sources. Sev-
eral insurance companies, however, have taken ad-
vantage of a literal construction of these clauses 
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to redu<.:e their liability belo\Y the limits of the 
endorsement where the claimant received work-
man's compensation lJenefits, even though he was 
not fully indemnified. In these instances, the 
companies persuaded the courts that the endorse-
ment's language is 'clear and unambiguous: and 
that therefore the court had no right to make a 
new contract for the parties. However, other 
courts have invalidated this clause, finding such 
clauses repugnant to the state's public policy as 
manifested in the mandatory uninsured motorist 
endorsement legislation. In those cases the insur-
er's obligation was held to be fixed and irreduce-
able regardless of what other sources of indemni-
fication might be available to the insured-claim-
ant. Rather than totally disregarding such 
clauses, the better rule would be to interpret the 
policy's terms so that the insured would be enti-
tled to recover until he is fully indemnified, but 
would not secure a multiple recovery through re-
ceipt of proceeds from the uninsured motorist en-
dorsement. It would be more desirable to alter 
the language of the standard endorsement to pro-
vide expressly for such coverage than to initiate 
a state-by-state litigation process to determine 
which state will accept the present limitation of 
the standard policy." (Emphasis added). 
Further illustration of this trend is found in the case 
of Southeast Furniture Company and The State Insur-
ance Fund v. Dean L. Barrett and The Industrial Com-
u~ission of Utah (1970) ______ Utah 2d ------, (1970) 465 P.2d 
~46, wherein the Utah Justices unequivocally rejected an 
argument that Uninsured Motorist contract benefits 
eould be used to eliminate or reduce amounts due under 
workmen's compensation benefits. 
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Reference has been made by appellant to Martin v. 
Christensen, 22 Utah 2d ±15, 454 P.2d 294 (1969). Tlw 
facts of that case are unique in that one insurance com-
pany had issued two separate policies of insurance on 
automobiles in the same household. Presumably there 
was evidence of reduced premium because of the dupli-
cation of coverage and the policy provisions against ac-
cumulation of same. 
Appellant fails to note to the court the entire text 
of APPLEJJ1AN, INSURANCE LAW AND PRAC-
TICE, Volume 8, p. 400. The entire text is as follows: 
"It has been held that where the owner of an 
automobile or truck has a policy with an omnibus 
clause, and the additional insured also has a non-
ownership policy which provides that it shall only 
constitute excess coverage over and above any 
other valid, collectible insurance, the owner's in-
surer has the primary liability. In such case, the 
liability of the excess insurer does not arise until 
the limits of the collectible insurance under the 
primary policy have been exceeded. It should be 
noted that under this rule, the courts give no ap-
plication to the other insurance clause in the pri-
mary policy, which provides that if the additional 
insured has other valid and collectible insurance, 
he shall not be covered by the primary policy that 
is because the insurance under the excess coverage 
policy is not regarded as other collectible insur-
ance, as it is not available to the insured until the 
primary policy has been exhausted ... " 
We do not take issue with the brief excerpt appellant 
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has cited to the court in National lndcninity Company v. 
Lead Sitpplie~, Inc., 195 F. ~upp. 249, 255 (1960), being 
a correct statement of ordinary contract law: however, 
insurance policies are not so literally construed as noted 
from a further excerpt from that opinion: 
"Different factors and principles are involved 
in those situations. Policies containing only 'pro 
ra ta' clauses are in harmony and consonant with 
each other in that each asserts, if multiple over-
lapping coverage exists, the same mathematical 
computation for resolving the concurrent in-
surance problem. And if multiple 'excess' clauses 
conflict or, as in the much-quoted case of Oregon 
Automobile Ins. Co. v. United States Fidelity 
& Guar. Co., 9 Cir., 1952, 195 F. 2d 958, supra, 
where an 'excess' clause conflicted with an 'escape' 
clause, each insurer purported to disclaim re-
sponsibility if other coverage was available. If 
such policies are to be construed and applied ac-
cording to their terms, an intolerable situation 
would be created. 'Escape' and 'exceRs' provisions 
are indeed mutually repugnant to each other for 
a resolution of the problem thereunder depends 
upon which policy is read first. As the court in 
Reeh v. W erch, supra, has observed, 'any attempt 
to give effect to both clauses puts one on a per-
petual mental merry-go-round.' 98 N.W. 2d at 
page 926.'' 
Respondent submits that this Court should sustain 
the conclusion of trial court as supported by the authori-
ties cited which indicate that the legislative intent in en-
acting a mandatory Uninsured ~fotorist Law was to af-
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ford compensation to lJL'rsons such as ~liss Lyon up to 
the amount of her actual damages. 
POINT II 
SINCE RESPOXDENT'~) D_LiIAGES EXCEED ALL 
AVAILABLE PUBLIC LIABILITY AXD l'XIXSGRED "JIO-
TORISTS INSURANCE, HARTFORD HAS XO RIGHT OF 
SETOFF AGAINST THEIR "CXIXSURED J:OTORIST COY-
ERAGE NOR A SUBROGATION RIGHT FOR THE $2,000.00 
PAID BY THEl\I TO RESPONDENT. 
41-12-21.1 L"tah Code ~\nnotated as amended by the 
Chapter Laws of 1961, reads as follow:::: 
1Iotor yehicle liability policy - l-ninsured 
motorist coyerage required. - Commencing on 
July 1. 1964, no auto~nobile liability in:::urance pol-
icy insuring against loss resulting from liability 
imposed by law for bodily injury or death or prop-
erty damage suffered by any person arising out 
of the ownership, maintenance or uses of a motor 
Yehicle. shall be deliYered. issued for deli"\ery, or 
renewed in this state. with respect to an:- motor 
Yehide registered or principally garaged in thi;-; 
state, unless coYerage is pro\ided in such policy 
or a snpplemt•nt to it. in limits for bodily injury 
or death set forth in section 41-1~-5. under pro-
Yisions filed with and appnn-ed by the state in-
suranL't' L'onu11issitn1 for the proteetion of persons 
in:rnrt•d tht•remhler "-}w are legally entitled to re-
L't)n'r dmnages from L)wners or operators of un-
insurt'd nwh)r ye}ricles ~rnd hit-and-run motor w-
hides lwcause t)f bL)d~ly injury. sickness or disease. 
indnding dt•ath. res:1lting therefrL)lll. Tht- named 
illc'11rtd shall lwrl· tlit· ripli• f,; rt) l'i ~11ch c11 rd-
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age, and unless the 11amed insured requests such 
coverage in writing, such coverage need not be 
proi·ided in a renewal policy or a supplement to 
it where named insured had rejected the coverage 
in connection with a policy previously issued to 
him uy the .-;ame in.surer. (Emphasis added). 
In support of respondent's motion for summary 
j ndgrnent seeking to recover the $2,000.00 Medical Pay-
ments Coverage paid by Hartford to l\liss Lyon under 
her own family automobile policy, which sum was paid 
to the Clerk of Salt Lake County because of the contest 
as to who was entitled to same, an affidavit was procured 
from Mr. John T. Paradise, an examiner in the Utah 
State Insurance Department ( R. 77). In substance, that 
affidavit stated that Mr. Paradise was familiar with the 
premium rate filings of all companies writing casualty 
and property insurance policies in the State of Utah and 
that Uninsured l\f otorists and Medical Payment Cover-
ai:re are classified as casualty insurance. Further, the af-
fidavit stated: "Defendants above-named, and all similar 
l'tandard casualty insuring companies licensed in Utah, 
have on file in the department in which I am employed 
a fixed premium rate for Uninsured Motorists Cover-
age ... " 
"Defendants above-named, and the above re-
f erred to standard easualty insuring companies, 
do not reduce their premiums on Uninsured Mo-
torists Coverage if the policy holder purchases 
:Medical Payment Coverage." 
Hartford's policy purports to reduce its liability to 
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Miss Lyon, one of its narn0<l immreds, b)· the following 
btatement in its policy: 
'''l11w Company shall not bP obligated to pa~· 
under CovL>rage D - l ~ ninsured l\lotorists that 
part of tlw damag<·s whieh tht' insured may be en-
titled to reeover from the owner or operator of an 
uninsured highway vehicle which represents ex-
penses for medical services imid or payable undPr 
Coverage B - .l\ledical I:1Jxpense." (R. 44). 
In substance, what Hartford is trying to do is col-
lect a full, non-flexible, Uninsured Motorist premium not-
withstanding the prest•nce or absence of a contract for 
}[edical Payments Coverage. This would constitute a 
windfall to Hartford and is obviously against public pol-
icy. See Sims v. National CasitaUy Company, (Fla. 
19(i5), 171 So. :.M 399: also 2-!- ..A.L.R. 3d 1353 for cases 
discussing such a clause as being invalid as constituting 
an attempt to reduce unimmred motorist liability below 
statutory minimums. 
Ht>re this ease di!'frrs from State Farm Mitf1t.al l11-
.rnnt11C<' Co»LJ)(lll.IJ i:. FarJ/lers !ns11ra11ce Exchange, ~:2 
l'tah 183, -!-50 P.:Zd-!5.S (19()9), in that Miss Lyon's darn-
agt>s ('X('e>ed all availahl(• puhlic liability irnmranee: 
Allstate (Butcher's company) $10,000.00, Yosemite 
( ~lartinez's undPr thP omnibus dause, making his insur-
aJH'P appli('ahle to Miss Ly(m as a µ;nest passenger) $10,-
000.00, Hartford C~Iiss Lyon's O\\·n insuring company 
under a single limit policy) $20,000.00. 
I 
I 
~ 
' I 
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Public policy dictates that as between an insured and 
nn insurer, if one is to receive a windfall it should be the 
immred (although in view of the damages, there is no 
windfall here) who has paid the fixed arbitrary premium 
io insure against a certain loss. Notman, A Decennial 
/-:tudy of the Uninsured Motorist Endorsement, NOTRE 
DA~II~ LA \VYER (October 1967) at page 16, see also 
Stephe1l v. Allied Mutual Insi1;rance Company (Nebraska 
1968), 156 N.W. 2d 133, wherein the court was construing 
nn identical statute as became la-vv in that state in 1967, 
1.:, set out at the beginning of this point. The Nebraska 
eourt stated after discussing its fact situation involving 
a judgment in excess of Uninsured Motorists Coverage 
~nd Medical Payments Coverage, (page 136) : 
"A provision, drawn by the insurer to comply 
with the statutory requirement of uninsured mo-
torist coverage, must be construed in light of thf• 
purpose and policy of the statute. Such a provi-
:-ion, drawn in pursuance of a statutorily declared 
public policy, is enacted for the benefit of injured 
persons traveling on the public highways. Its pur-
pose is to give the same protection to the person 
injured by an uninsured motorist as he would have 
had if he had been injured in an accident caused 
by an automobile covered by a standard liability 
policy. Such provisions are to be liberally con-
strued to accomplish such purpose." (Citing 
cases). 
• • • 
and at page 139 : 
"The argument as to the effect of this provi-
sion, as distinguished from its basic nature, be-
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comes dieledically comvkx. If the provision does 
not limit coverag<-', as the i1rnurer contends, \VP 
fail to see its pnrpo~;''· ~-~urdy its object is not to 
give additional covc•rage to the insured. Con-
versely, if its purpose is to alter or change thE' 
company liability for tho separately charged pre-
mium for medical payments, it \\-ould have to bP 
struck down as an alteration of the separately 
contracted for contractual risk assumed by thP 
insurer under the terms of the medical payment 
coverage. 
"The general rule is that an insurer may not 
limit its liability un<ler uninsured motorist cover-
age by setoffs or limitations through 'other insur-
ance,' excess insurance, or medical payment re-
duction clauses, and this is true even when the set-
off for the reduction is claimed with respect to a 
separate, independent policy of insurance (work-
men's compensation) or other insured motorist 
coverage. And this is true because the insured is 
entitled to recover the same amount he would have 
recovered if the offending motorist had maintain-
ed liability insurance." (Citing cases). 
Respondent and cross-appellant submit that if this 
Court believes its holding in State Farm Mutual v. 
Fa·rmers is not against public policy, the rule of this jur-
isdiction should be confined to the fact situation of that 
case and should not apply \\-hen damages exceed all avail-
able insurance coverage. 
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POINT III 
IF THE COURT CONCLUDES HARTFORD HAS A SUB-
ROGATION RIGHT FOR THE $2,000.00 MEDICAL PAY-
MENTS MADE BY IT, THE JUDGMENT OF THE LOWER 
COURT GRANTING RESPONDENT AN ATTORNEYS' FEE 
AW ARD FOR RECOVERING SAID SUl\1 ON BEHALF OF 
HARTFORD IS CORRECT AND SHOULD BE SUSTAINED 
Appellant does not consider the record as a whole in 
this case when, at page 10 of its brief, it is claimed that 
llartford didn't accept the benefit of the efforts of plain-
tiff's counsel. By the time this case was tried ]n August 
of 1969, a summary judgment for liability had already 
hePn entered in May, 1969 (R. :HO). An offer of judg-
ment was made on behalf of Butcher on June 19, 1969, for 
t}w limit of his policy plns taxable costs (R. 222) and, 
only thereafter, on .July 21 did appellant file a motion 
and complaint in intervention (R 222 et sequitar). There 
is no other evidence that Allstate \Vas willing to pay its 
$10,000.00 policy limits until forced to trial, and, obvious-
ly, after not wanting to be caught in a position of bad 
faith bargaining by their own insured, Robert G. Butcher. 
Under basic quantum meruit principles, if Hartford 
~l'riously believes that it is entitled to reduce its liability 
under its Uninsured Motorist Coverage, as heretofore 
discussed in Point II, it seems unconscionable that they 
should be permitted to idly accept the benefits, without 
C'ost, of its insured's prosecution of a civil action to esta-
blish liability, amount of damages, recoupment of some 
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of the damages, and then demand the benefits of 
same by asserting its clairnPd subrogation right. In Stat{' 
Farm vs. Fanncrs, supra, it is admitted this Court up-
held the subrogation rig11t for uwdical payments madt>. 
Presumably evidence must liavt> be(~n adduced, in addition 
to mere contract interpretation, of some reduced pre-
mium factor in return for :mch provision, or underwrit-
ing considerations were taken into account by the insur-
ing company in order to support the conclusion that such 
a clause was not against public policy. \Ve submit if an 
insurance company is attempting to contract itself into a 
windfall by reducing its exposure as Hartford did herP 
and still charges a full premium for an item of coverage 
without regard to the reduced exposure, this is against 
public policy. The windfall, if there is one, should be that 
of the insured, not the insurer, and such clause should be 
voided or, in the alternativP, an immred should equitably 
he entitled to collect attorneys' fees for the recoupment. 
Reference has been to the ease of Black vs. Black, 17 
Utah 2d, 369, 412 P. 2d 45-t, for the proposition that at-
torneys' fees eannot lw taxt>d to assess same. That case 
differs from the instant a\rard by Judge Hall which is 
sustained by the following PXC('rpts from 45 A.L.R. 2d at 
1186 and 1187 : 
"It appears to he well settled that where the 
natural and proximate consequence of a tortious 
act of defendant has been to involve plaintiff in 
litigation with a third person, reasonable com-
pensation for attorneys' fees incurred by plaintiff 
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in such action may be recovered as damages 
against the author of the tortious act. All the 
cases support either expressly or by necessary 
implication this general principle: 
• • • 
"This is also the rule of the Restatement8 , 
where it is stated that 'a person who through thf~ 
tort of another ha::; been required to act in the 
protection of his interests by bringing or defend-
ing an action against a third person is entitled to 
recover compensation for the reasonably neces-
sary los::; of time, attorney fees and other expend-
itures thereby suffered or incurred.' 
8Restatement, Torts ~914." 
Even though this is an action in contract to recover 
under an insurance policy, plaintiff's action against ap-
pellant also lays in tort for intentional negligent breach 
of said contract, and, therefore, the award of attorneys' 
fees would be proper if the Court rules against respond-
ent on Point II. 
POINT IV 
THIS BEING AN ACTION ON A CONTRACT BETWEEN 
AN INSURED AND AN INSURER, RESPONDENT SHOULD 
BE ENTITLED TO LEGAL INTEREST OF SIX PER CENT 
PER ANNUM FROM THE DATE OF HER LOSS, FEBRUARY 
4, 1969, - THE DATE SHE WAS INJURED, UNTIL AUGUST 
7, 1969, WHEN JUDGMENT WAS ENTERED IN THE FIRST 
CIVIL ACTION. 
The only case the writer has been able to locate on 
this point of cross-appeal is that of Standard Accident 
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Insurance Company 1;::;, Gai:in, (Florida 1966), 184 So. 
2d, 229, 2-± A.L.R ;)d 1 ;};)9. In that case the Florida court 
stated: 
·'The Court further· finds, over the objection 
of the defendant that the plaintiff is entitled to 
interest on the said sum of $20,000.00 from th<> 
date of death of her husband. Although the dam-
ages sustained by the plaintiff arose by reason 
of a tort commited by an uninsured motorist, 
plaintiff's action against the defendant is an ac-
tion on her contract of insurance with the defend-
ant and is not an action sounding in tort. Accord-
ingly, interest is due on the amount of damages 
which plaintiff is entitled to recover under her 
contract with defendant from the date said dam-
ages were sustained and became due and payable." 
From an examination of the exhibit file of the ori-
ginal civil action, Civil No. lS-1-994 (Vol. II of the tran-
script on this appeal), a review of the photographic do-
cumentation received by the court in that civil action of 
Miss Lyon's injuries, notice of the nature and extent of 
which was served upon appt>llant before the August 1969 
trial, (R. 208-9 and 11~xhihit P-7 in the instant appeal) 
should beyond all <louht lui.w· plaePd appellant on notice 
of ib:; legal obligation to pay and, therefore, interest 
should be owed l\liss Lyon undt>r her contract. 
POINT V 
RESPONDENT HAS A CAUSE OF ACTION AGAINST 
APPELLANT BECAUSE OF ITS FAILURE TO BARGAIN 
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WITH HER IN AN ATTEMPT TO SETTLE HER INJURY 
CLAIM WITHIN OR FOR THE AMOUNT OF APPELLANT'S 
COVERAGE EXPOSURE WITHOUT THE NECCESSITY OF A 
LAWSUIT, APPELLANT HAVING AT ALL TIMES BEEN ON 
ACTUAL NOTICE OF THE NATURE AND EXTENT OF RE-
SPONDENT'S PERSONAL INJURIES, HER PERMANENT 
DISFIGUREMENT AND THE SEVERITY OF SAME. 
Exhibits P-3 through P-14 in this case were received 
into evidence by the trial court in support of the docu-
1rn~ntation of notice to appellant of all stages of these pro-
<'eedings. An examination of the certificates of mailing 
by respondent's counsel of copies of pleadings at all 
stages of the proceedings is contained in Volume II of the 
transcript in this appeal, which is the pleading file in the 
original civil action. Hartford is in no position to assert 
lack of notice of the nature and extent of Miss Lyon'~ 
permanent facial injuries. In fact, the motion for an im-
mediate trial after a summary judgment for liability had 
been granted, (R. 198 and 206), advised them that special 
damages were approaching $10,000.00. 
No case law has been located in the United States for 
or against the proposition that an insurance company has 
a duty to bargain with its insured to settle an uninsured 
·motorist claim. In UNIVERSITY OF SAN FRANCIS-
.CO LAW REVIETV, Volmne Ill, page 46, is a discussion 
of the problem and potential liability of an insuring com-
l>:tny under a fact situation similar to Barbara Lyon's. 
TJw author's observations are as follows: 
"FNINSURED MOTORIST INSURERS' 
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LIAILITY FOll LEGAL EXPEN8ES THE IN-
SURED INCURS lN" ARBITRATING HI 8 
CLAIM. Assume that an insured car r i e ::; 
$15,000.00 in uninsured motorist coverage. As-
sume further that an uninsured motorist injures 
the insured so severly that if the case against the 
motorist were litegated in a personal injmy 
action, the insured would recover a $50,000 judg-
ment. At this point, the insured would probably 
consult an attorney. A competent attorney will 
recognize that the insured's claim ·worth exceedi:; 
the policy's limits. rrhe insured and the attorney 
are likely to enter into the following retainer 
agreement: (1) for a fee of $200.00, the attorney 
promises to furnish the insurer with all the neces-
sary documents and infom1ation to collect the 
$15,000.00 face amount of the policy; and ( 2) the 
attorney promises that if the insurer refuses to 
pay the face amount of the policy he will pro-
secute the insured's claim on a contingent basis 
for 331/s % of the award. Since the claim is an 
uninsured motorist claim, the claim against the 
insurer will be arbitrated. On these facts, the 
arbitration award would be for $15,000.00 But 
since the insured had to pay his attorney $5,000.00 
rather than $200.00, the insurer's refusal to settle 
cost the insured $4,800.00. Can the insured hold 
the insurer liable for the $±,800.00 "? 
"The answer to this question depends upon the 
courts' willingness to analogize to the Crisci fact 
situation." (Crisci, v. Security I nsttrance Com-
pany _ 426 P. 2d 173) (1967). 
"It can be argued that the analogy to the Cris-
ci fact situation is seriously defective. Superfi-
cially, there is a clear distinction between the two 
situations. In the Crisci fact situation, the insur-
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er's refusal to settle re:::;ults in an excess judg-
ment. It is true that where the uninsured motor-
ist insurer refuses to settle the insured does not 
suffer an excess judgment. On the other hand, the 
uninsured motorist insurer's refusal to settle 
causes the insured a definite financial loss. The 
only uifierence between the two situations is the 
way in which the insurer causes the insured a 
financial loss. In the Crisci fact situation, the loss 
occurs by way of legal expenses. In both cases, 
the insurer's refusal to settle causes the insured a 
financial Joss. If the uninsured motorist insurer's 
refusal to settle is wrongful, it seems that the in-
surer :::;hould be held liable for the insur2d's legal 
expenses. It is the opinion of this author that if 
the case arises, a California court would analogize 
to the Crisci case an<l hold the insurer liable for 
the $4,800.00." 
It is obvious that J'ifiss Lyon has been damaged and 
should be compensated for same because of the refusal of 
Hartford to even bargain with her. The file and all of 
the evidence adduced up to the summary judgment pro-
ceedings from which this appeal arises does not diclose 
one scintilla of evidence that Hartford at any time has 
lJeen willing to bargain or settle their obligation to Miss 
Lyon. 
See R. 179, et sequitur, for stipulations on notice to 
appellant and its agents and the failure to take any action 
t0 determine its liability to Miss Lyon. 
Tlw eourt's attention is directed to Andeen v. Coun-
try llhthwl !11surn11ce Com1J<1ny, :217 N.E. 2d 814. In that 
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case the insurance company had written a $30,000.00 Un. 
insured Motorists Policy. rrhey permitted a default 
judgment to be entered against the uninsured motorist 
defendant in the sum of $60,000.00. The Supreme Court, 
in a dircet action suit against the insurance company, 
held them liable for the total arnount of the default judg-
ment. See also Potomac Insurance Company v. Wilkins 
Company, 376 F. 2d 425, Tenth Circuit (1967), support-
ing the trend of authorities obligating insurance compan-
iGs to bargain and represent their insureds' interests. 
CONCLUSION 
Respondent and cross-appellant respectfully submits 
that she having purchased a policy of Uninsured Motor-
ist Coverage with appellant in the sum $20,000.00, and 
her damages having been assessed by a jury and exceed-
ing liability and uninsured motorist insurance limits, the 
judgment of The Honorable Gordon R. Hall awarding 
her further compensation should be sustained. Likewise, 
since a separate policy of medical payments insurance 
was written and there is no possible double compensation 
from insurance companies, it is against public policy to 
permit reduction in liability because of offsetting insur-
ance clauses in the same policy, especially when the only 
evidence is no reduced premium factor was afforded her. 
Should this court affirm the rationale of State Farm v. 
Farmers as controlling, Hartford should not be permitted 
to accept insurance premiums without assuming an obli-
g·ation to their insured and her attorney for recoupment 
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of the subrogated amount. rl111i8 being an action based 
upon a contract, legal intere::;t of six per cent ( 6%) per 
annum should be owed from the date of the loss. Appell-
ant having willfully and intentionally breached its con-
tractual duty of compensation to Miss Lyon for damages 
obviously due her in excess of Hartford and other insur-
ance limits, this matter should be remanded for trial to 
t>stablish the amount of damages sustained by her. 
Respectfully submitted, 
HATCH, McRAE,, RICHARD80N 
& KINGHORN 
By Robert M. McRae 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
and Respondent 
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